上海治理论坛第403期（原红旗教授，，，，，复旦大学）

题    目：Internal Ratings and Loan Contracting: Evidence from a State-owned Bank around a Massive Economic Stimulus Programme（内部评级和贷款条约：来自一家国有银行大规模经济刺激妄想的证据）

演 讲 人：原红旗，，，，，复旦大学治理学院教授

主 持 人：徐宗宇，，，，，上海大学治理学院教授

时    间：2019年10月16日（周三），，，，，下昼1:30

地    点：校本部东区治理学院420室

主理单位：8188cc威尼斯治理学院、8188cc威尼斯治理学院青年西席联谊会

演讲人简介：

复旦大学治理学院会计学系教授，，，，，博士生导师。。。。美国斯坦福大学、香港科技大学会见学者。。。。研究偏向为财务会计和公司财务。。。。曾多次主持、加入国家自然科学、社会科学基金项目。。。。论文揭晓在《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》、《Contemporary Accounting Research》、《治理天下》、《经济学（季刊）》、《会计研究》等海内外优异期刊。。。。

演讲内容简介：

Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Importantly, the rating-interest relation goes back to normal after the stimulus programme ends, suggesting that any deviation is temporary. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

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